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Toward an Interstate Standard of Equal
Protection of the Laws: A Speculative Essay
Arthur S. Miller*
Jeffrey H.Bowman**
Today, the fourteenth amendment embodies much of what
has become our natural-law Constitution. After a century, the
amendment stands as both a symbol of national unity and a
practical guarantee of nationally established rights.
-Kenneth L. Karst * * *

"During the twentieth century, the United States became a
united state. Given the world and national history of our troubled century, that was probably inevitable, and there is surely
no turning back . . . ."I That comment by Professor Theodore
Lowi is the basic theme of this essay, which suggests that the
time has come for our constitutional law to recognize that we are
indeed a "united state." The immediate focus will be upon equal
protection of the laws, an express limitation on the states only,
but a concept that is at times "incorporated" into the fifth
amendment's due process limitation on the federal government.
We argue for a national-an interstate-standard for equal protection, predicated on the basic position that the term, "the
laws," in the fourteenth amendment should be interpreted to
mean more than those of one state or one jurisdiction only.
That, to be sure, cuts against the grain of orthodox equal
protection doctrine. But it is the next logical step for equal protection interpretation to take. In a well-known sentence, Archibald Cox maintained that "[olnce loosed, the idea of equality is
* Professor Emeritus of Law,The George Washington University.
** J.D., The George Washington University, 1979. This author is an attorney in the
general counsel's office of the Federal Election Commission. The opinions in the Article
are personal to the authors and should not be attributed to the Cornmiision.
*** Karst, Not One Law at Rome and Another at Athens: The Fourteenth Amendment in Nationwide Application, 1972 WASH.U.L.Q. 383, 404.
1. T. LOWI,THE ENDOF LIBERALISM
295 (2d ed. 1979).
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not easily cabined."' Surely that is accurate. A little over a halfcentury ago, Justice Holmes, in an opinion his idolators would
like to forget, called equal protection the usual last resort of constitutional arguments-and brusquely dismissed Carrie Buck's
plea that she should not be involuntarily sterilized.. Since then
the idea of equal protection has indeed been loosed so that commentators routinely talk about the "new" or "substantive" equal
protection.
That familiar learning will not be retraced here. Nor is this
essay an exhaustive delineation of all of the nuances and permutations of interstate equal protection; rather, it is a speculative
essay, designed more to stimulate debate than to answer all of
the questions of such a doctrinal extension. We recognize that it
will take a considerable mental leap into the dark future for
others to grasp and agree with our net conclusion. The discussion below begins with an examination of the "new" jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, which cannot be traced beyond
Cooper u. Aaron4 in 1958, and then proceeds to set forth the
arguments, pro and con, for interstate equal protection. The resurrection of substantive due process with its significant elements
of equal protection, in conjunction with the concept of "reverse
incorporation" and the potential meaning of "national citizenship," suggests that the growth of equal protection is far from
over.
11. THEHISTORICAL
AND SOCIAL
CONTEXT
OF EQUAL
PROTECTION
The nation began in 1789 without an equality principle in
the Constitution, it having been dropped after enunciation in
the Declaration of Independence. Only when the Civil War produced the fourteenth amendment did one appear-as a limitation on the states alone, not on the federal government. Only in
this century-and, then, mostly since 1954-has the principle
This essay does not
been applied to the federal govern~nent.~
trace that development, for Professor Karst's recent discussion
of the congruence between the equality protections of the four2. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1 s Term-Foreword: Constitutionul Adjudication
and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARVL. REV. 91 (1966).
3. Buck v. Bell,274 U.S. 200 (1927).
4. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
5. See Bolling v. Sharpe,347 U.S. 497 (1954); Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. REV. 541 (1977).
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teenth and fifth amendments ably sets out the several considerations therein?
Historically, equal protection provides a classic illustration
of one aspect of the "living" or "operative" Constitution. The
words in the document remain the same, but their content continues to change through time. That disturbs some commentators, who believe that we have an "imperial judiciary" or "government by judiciary."' Those accusations are hardly accurate,
even though their basis-that the Supreme Court has read new
meaning into ancient clauses-is correct. There should be no
surprise that a further extension of equal protection is recommended. Cardozo once maintained that there were fields in the
"domain of law where fundamental conceptions have been developed to their uttermost conclusions by the organon of 10gic."~
He was not then talking about the Constitution; and it is by no
means clear that he was correct. The genius of American law,
including the area of "constitutional common law,"@is that principles have a way of being ameliorated in a sort of Hegelian synthesis, or of striking some type of Aristotelian golden mean,
rather than being extended to the outermoat limits of their logic.
To cite but one relevant example, Shelley u. Kramerlo could
have revolutionized private law; but it has not. The principle has
scarcely been extended since 1948. Nevertheless, as de Tocqueville noted a century and a half ago, there seems to be a
marked tendency toward egalitarianism in the United States.ll
That, according to the late Professor Alexander Bickel,lg has
been one of the drummers to which the Supreme Court has
marched in recent decades. The history of Supreme Court lawmaking since Buck u. Bell evidences the accuracy of Bickel's
observation.
It is not that the actual social structure in the United States
has been altered substantially-as Bickel implied-because it
has not. No massive redistribution of wealth has occurred, although members of the working class have been able to catch at
6. Karst, supra note ***.
7. E.g., R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY
(1977);L. GRAGLIA,
DISASTER
BY DECREE (1976);Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, 41 PUB.INTEREST 104 (1975).
8. SELECTEDWRITINGS
OF BENJAMIN
NATHAN
CARDOZO
294 (M. Hall ed. 1947).
9. See Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HAW.L. REV.1 (1975).
10. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
11. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA
(F. Borren ed. la).
THE SUPREMECOURT
AND THE IDEAOF PROGRESS
103 (1970).
12. A. BICKEL,
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least some crumbs from the groaning table of economic opulence
that is the United States. The expansion of equal protection law
occurred almost entirely during America's true "golden
age9'-that time from about 1945 to 1970 when the dollar was
king and American military might supreme, when commentators
could seriously talk about a Pax Americana, and when economic
growth within the United States seemed to know no bounds.13
However, in the last ten years recognition of "the limits to
growth" and the coming of a steady-state economy has so altered the social milieu1' in which constitutional norms are applied that one must recognize that discussions of constitutional
issues outside of the social context in which they arise tend,
more and more, to be mere sterile exercises in doctrinal exegesis-helpful perhaps to lawyers but not at all helpful to the lawyer-judges who sit upon the High Bench.16 The point is obvious.
At least, it should be obvious; but it is little acknowledged in the
law journals and elsewhere in the legal profession. "Legalism9'-the notion that law is there, separate and apart from the
warp and woof of society-still is the prevailing ideology of lawyers.'. That is a pathetic fallacy, but one routinely purveyed to
thousands of law students.
A full contextual analysis is not possible within the scope of
this essay. SufEce it merely to draw attention to Professor Lester
C. Thurow's insightful book, The Zero-Sum Society? He maintains that the political (for which, read constitutional) order is
in disarray, unable to deal effectively with the consequences of
burgeoning and coalescing economic problems such as inflation,
unemployment, slow growth, low productivity, environmental
decay, economic discrimination, and inequality, because massive
distributional actions must be taken. "In the past," Thurow
says, "political and economic power was distributed in such a
way that substantial economic losses could be imposed on parts
of the population . . . . Economic losses were allocated to particular powerless groups rather than spread across the population. These groups are no longer willing to accept losses and are
13. See A. MILLER,
DEMOCRATIC
DICTATORSHIP:
THE EMERGENT
CONSTITUTION
OF
CONTROL
(1981).
ECOLOGY
AND THE POLITICS
OF SCARCITY(1976).
14. See W.OPHULS,
15. For examples, see almwt any issue of the Supreme Court Review and any of the
Harvard Law Review's annual summaries of Supreme Court activities.
16. See J. SHKLAR,
LEGALISM
(1964).
17. L. THUROW,
THE ZERO-SUM
SOCIETY
(1980).
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able to raise substantially the costs for those who wish to impose
losses upon them?
The meaning in political or constitutional terms is paradoxical: pluralism as a political order is breaking down simply because it has been succes~ful.~@
Thurow ends his important discussion of "the zero-sum society" with these ominous words:
As we head into the 19808, it is well to remember that
there is really only one important question in political economy. If elected, whose income do you and your party propose
to cut in the process of solving the economic problems facing
us? Our economy and the solutions to its problems have a substantial zero-sum element. Our economic life would be easier if
this were not true, but we are going to have to learn to play a
zero-sum economic game. If we cannot learn, or prefer to pretend that the zero-sum problem does not exist, we are simply
going to faiPO

Law, including constitutional law, is a reflection of economics. A
number of zero-sum Supreme Court decisions on equal protection have been rendered in recent years-Bakke,"
Weber,22
and F u l l i l ~ v eare
~ ~perhaps the outstanding examRodrigue~,'~
ples. The Justices are playing a zero-sum economics game while
using lawyers' language-an example of how economists and
lawyers can be talking about the same thing but using different
word symbols, and thus not communicating at all (as John R.
Commons observed in 1950)?
In sum, then, equal protection law and its analysis by courts
and commentators alike should be seen in the context of the
zero-sum society. That society is, as Lowi says, a "united state."
The thesis of this essay is that it is both feasible and desirable to
think of equal protection as a national standard, one that recognizes "the claims of equal national citizenship" in a "national
c~rnrnunity,'~~
with that standard being interstate, not intra18. Id. at 12.
19. See A. Miller, Oracb in the Marble Palace: Politics and the Supreme Court
(manuscript in possession of author); T. LOWI,supra note 1. See also H. KARIEL,THE
DECLINE
OF AMERICAN
PLURALISM
(1961).
L. THUROW,
supra note 17, at 214.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
J. COMMONS,
Tm ECONOMICS
OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION
309-14 (1950).
Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword:Equal Citizenship Under the
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state. The fourteenth amendment, of course, speaks in terms of
no state denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. That delphic command is far from clear,
as dozens of cases illustrate. But those decisions revolve around
two basic questions-what is state action? and what is equal
protection?-and one important, but seldom discussed, question: what is a person? It is familiar learning that state action
has been an evolving concept whose development is not yet over,
and that equal protection is determined by different standards
according to the factual contexts in which issues arise. As for the
problem of who or what is a person, a tribunal that without argument conceded that the disembodied entities called corporations are constitutional personsa7almost a century later refused
that status to a f e t ~ s . 3 ~
The meaning of the word, "laws," in the fourteenth amendment has not been subjected to rigorous analysis by scholars.
Historically, of course, it meant the laws of a given state or of a
given jurisdiction within one state. At most, the Court, as in
Yick Wo v. Hopkinsywhas been willing at times to penetrate the
thicket of administration and determine how given statutes or
ordinances are administered; or it has made, as in PalmePo and
Davisyslthe motivation of legislators the determining criterion.
~
majority
In Sun Antonio School District v. R o d r i g u e ~a, ~Court
rejected disparities of financing between school districts, finding
no equal protection violation.
If one takes an antiquarian view of constitutional interpretation, resting primarily on stare decisis and ultimately on the
intentions of those who wrote the fourteenth amendment, then
the answer to the question-should there be an interstate standard of equal protection?-is easy: No. But the Justices, save
when they wished, and that is seldom, have never been circumscribed by such a rigid view of interpretation. Those who acknowledge, in Professor Ray Forrester's language, "truth in
judging,"ss readily concede that the Justices make up the law as
they go along-always have, as Justice White said in Mirunda v.
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HAW. L. REV. 1 (1977).
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. Ry., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
403 U.S. 217 (1971).
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Forrester, Are We Ready for %th in Judging?, 63 A.B.A.J. 1212 (1977).
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ArizonaM-and no doubt will continue to do so as long as the
Court functions. Indeed, as Justice Brennan flatly stated in
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,s6 "Under our system, judges
are not mere umpires, but, in their own sphere, lawmakers-a
coordinate branch of government.'" The road, thus, is open for
new vistas to be seen in equal protection law-and it is one of
those vistas that we advocate: Equal protection, to repeat,
should include discriminations among states, with "laws" meaning the laws of other states as well, whenever fundamental rights
are at issue. A tribunal that can swallow, without difficulty, the
notion that an artificial economic collectivity is a person, and
even extend freedom of speech to it? surely should be able to
read the word "laws" more expansively.

That there is a sociological basis for the United States being
a united state admits of no doubt. Americans are far more
closely knit together today, because of scientific and technological developments in transportation, communications, and other
economic activities, than were their predecessors in 1787, 1800,
1850, or even 1900. There have been more changes in the human
condition in the little more than a century since the fourteenth
amendment was placed in the Constitution than in known
human history before 1868. We are in the midst today of a third
industrial revolution, one which bids fair to alter the environment in which Homo sapiens exist more than either the first or
second," and one which can only be compared to the agricultural revolution that occurred eons ago. There should, therefore,
be little wonder that ancient constitutional mechanisms and institutions are being adapted to new social conditions. The scrutiny here is on one of those institutions-the Supreme Court of
the United States and its "new" jurisprudence of the past quarter-century.
Our account, necessarily brief, begins with Cooper u.
34. 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
35. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
36. Id. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring).
37. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See Miller, On Politics, Democracy, and the First Amendment: A Commentary on First National Bank v.
Bellotti, WASH.
& LEZ L. REV. - (1981).
THE MICROREVOLUTION(1980); A. BURKFTT
& E. WILLIAMS,
38. See, e.g., P. LARGE,
THE SILICON
CIVILIZATION
(1980).
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Aaron,3s the Little Rock school desegregation decision of 1958.
There, in a unique opinion individually signed by all nine Justices, the Court unanimously held that defiance of the principle
of Brown v. Board of Education ( I & II)'O could not be tolerated,
and that a Supreme Court decision was "the law of the land."41
As such, the Court said, it was, under the theory of article VI's
principle of federal supremacy, superior to and overriding of any
inconsistent state law or policy. In the words of Professor Philip
Kurland, "the Court seemed to assume the same scope for its
decision as the statute [the 1964 Civil Rights Act] could
claim."42 Kurland goes on to assert that "[a] Supreme Court
opinion, whatever its merits, cannot seriously be treated as the
equivalent of a statute for purposes of the Supremacy Clause.
Nor have they been so treated, however highly the Supreme
Court itself may regard some of them.'us
On the latter point, Professor Kurland is technically correct.
But on the larger matter he surely can be faulted. Decisions of
the Supreme Court, whether liked or not, are considered to be
"the law of the land" and thus to be the "equivalent of a statute
for purposes of the Supremacy Clause." Not only laymen but
members of the legal profession view those decisions as establishing a norm of conduct not unlike a statute. The meaning for
present purposes is clear: a decision on equal protection in, say,
a case coming from New York is the law of the land. That means
that law enforcement personnel in all other states are similarly
bound even though they could not be held in contempt for refusing to adhere to the decision. That, at least, is the inescapable
inference to be drawn from such decisions as Shapiro v. Thompson." There should not be, as Professor Karst has said in quoting Cicero, "one law at Rome and another at at hen^."^'
Although it is logically impossible to infer a general principle from a particular one, that is precisely what is being done.
Law is far from the logical endeavor that some think it is. Justice Felix Frankfurter said it well in 1954:
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

358 U.S. 1 (1958).
347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349
358 U.S. at 18.

U.S. 294 (1955).

P. KURLAND,
POLITICS,THE CONSTITUTION
AND
Id. at 186.
394

THE WARREN
COURT185

(1970).

US. 618 (1969).

Karst, Not One Law at Rome and Another at Athens: The Fourteenth Amendment in Nationwide Application, 1972 WASH.U.L.Q.383, 404 (1972).
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Human society keeps changing. Needs emerge, first vaguely
felt and unexpressed, imperceptibly gathering strength, steadily becoming more and more exigent, generating a force which,
if left unheeded and denied response so as to satisfy the impulse behind it at least in part, may burst forth with an intensity that exacts more than reasonable satisfaction. Law as the
response to those needs is not merely a system of logical deduction, though considerations of logic are far from irrelevant.
Law presupposes sociological wisdom as well as logical
unfolding.'"

One of the considerations of logic that distinctly is not relevant
is the plain and simple proposition that a Supreme Court decision in a single case (even though not a class action) is the statement of a general norm. Some language of Chief Justice Fred
Vinson is apposite: "[Ylou are," he told the American Bar Association, "in a sense, prosecuting or defending class actions; . . .
you represent not only your clients, but tremendously important
principles, upon which are based the plans, hopes, and aspirations of a great many people throughout the country."47 In other
words, cases are chosen not in the interests of the litigants but
in the interests of the development of the law-the development
of general principles. The Court rules not only for the parties at
the bar, but for generations yet unborn. The "class actions" that
are constitutional cases are, to be sure, "backdoor" or de facto
class actions, for often, perhaps usually, litigation is solely between the parties before the Court. (They can also validly be
called "backdoor" advisory opinion^.)^^ However, once the Justices have decided a dispute on the merits the result has the
practical, but not the technical, effect of binding everyone similarly situated throughout the nation. The meaning should be
clear: the Court has assumed "the role of a third legislative
chamber."4a Some decry thatFObut most do not deny it. For better or for worse, something akin to, but not exactly the same as,
46. F. FRANKFURTER,
OF LAWAND MEN35 (1956) (emphasis added).
47. Address by Chief Justice Vinson to the American Bar Association (Sept. 7,
1949), reprinted in 69 S. Ct. v, vi (1949). See Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De
Facto Class Actions, - U . DET.J. URB.L. - (1981).
48. See Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow
of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, in A. IMIUER, THESUPREME
COURT
261 (1978).
THE BIU OF RIGHTS
55 (1958).
49. L. HAND,
50. See, e.g., Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1361 (1979);
Bridwell, The Scope of Judicial Review: A Dirge for the Theorists of Majority Rule?, 31
S.C.L. REV.617 (1980).
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what the Framers refused to put into the Constitution when
drafted in 1787-a Council of Revision6'--has been created by
judicial assertion and public acquiescence.
That means, however, merely that a single Supreme Court
decision can have a statute-like efkect. As with Congress, the
Justices feel free to "repeal" previous decisions and to "enact"
others, for as Justice William 0.Douglas said in Glidden v. Zdanok, constitutional questions are "always open.'" There is another, more portentious development in the new jurisprudence,
heralded by Cooper v. Aaron-the propensity of the Court at
times, but far from always, to set forth its rulings in deliberate
general language. Cooper started it, but the process has not
ended. The decisions are not many, but they are significant.
They include, but are not limited to Reynolds v. S i m P (one
person/one vote); Miranda u. ArizonaU (on what police officers
should do with criminal suspects); Green v. School BoardB6(in
which an "affirmative duty" was imposed upon school boards to
integrate public schools); the abortion casesM (setting forth
when a woman may voluntarily have an abortion based on a trimester system); and United States u. Snepp6' (where a contractual agreement was held to override first amendment rights).
The point is that in these illustrative cases, the Justices openly
and outwardly used statutory-like language and wrote opinions
couched in general terms (for the entire nation) and with little
regard for the actual litigants. Clarence Gideon, to take another
example, was of little importance as an individual to the Court;
his significance was that the facts of his incarceration by Florida
provided a looked-for stimulus to make a general rule about the
availability of counsel in noncapital criminal cases." Support for
the point being made may be found in Piekering u. School
Board,6@
where Justice Marshall expressly refused to extend the
"rule of the case" beyond the specific facts of the Piekering
51. Under Randolph's proposed Council of Revision, every law passed by the legislature automatically would have been previewed by the judiciary before taking effect. See
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 189 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
370 U.S. 530, 592 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
444 U.S. 507 (1980), rehearing denied, 100 S. Ct. 1668 (1980).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
391 U.S. 563 (19f38).
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litigation.
This is not the time to discuss the matter further. Suffice it
to conclude that the time-honored result of the adversary system-the production of the "law of the case9'-is slowly being
changed to mean the "law of the land."60 From that may be derived the proposition that the "laws" covered by equal protection should have an interstate dimension in those areas considered to be "fundamental rights." That is the ultimate meaning
of Cooper v. Aaron. Our discussion now narrows to a case study
on voting, which will be used as an example for the larger
principle.
THE INDEPENDENT
VOTER
IV. ENFRANCHISING

In 1980 some 35 states held a presidential primary, determining over 65 percent of each convention's votes. Yet voters in
sixteen of these states, who did not wish to be publicly affiliated
with a political party, were statutorily barred from voting in
their state's primary. These states selected a total of 1,324 delegates to the Democratic and 735 delegates to the Republican
National Conventions. Statutes there prescribe a "closed primary," by which voting is restricted to those who, in some manner and at some time prior to voting, publicly declare their afFliation with a political party and have that affiliation recorded.
The consequence is a gross disenfranchisement of millions of
Americans that raises serious questions about the most significant voting bloc in the country, the independent voters.61 Is
60. Compare Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), with President Lincoln's views:
Judicial decisions "must be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit as to the object
of the suit," and "while they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in
all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government," nonetheless,
if the policy of the Government is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the
Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically assigned their Government into the hands of that
eminent tribunal.
JUDICIAL
REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL
PROCESS
213 (1980).
Quoted in J. CHOPER,
THESTRUGGLE
FOR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY
96-104 (1941) (discussing
See also R. JACKSON,
how national monetary policy was set by the Supreme Court in a lawsuit between private
parties involving the sum of $15.60).
61. There is a growing movement away from the two major political parties. A recent Gallup Poll, conducted from November 1980 to February 1981, indicates that 31%
of the American voters consider themselves to be "independents." (42% were Democrats
and 29% were Republicans). N.Y. Times, Mar. 8,1981, at 30, col. 2. Moreover, it is likely
that this figure will continue to grow in future elections since 45% of the voters under 30
THE CHANGING
classify themselves as independents. N. NIE, S. VERBA,& J. PBTROCSK,
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their fundamental right to vote fatally diluted? And, if so, are
they being accorded equal protection of the laws?
Political parties have existed in this nation for over 175
years and today dominate the presidential nominating process.
In most elections, participation in the political party nominating
process is the sine qua non to meaningful participation in the
electoral process. As the impetus for increased popular participation in the nominating process has grown from the progressive
movement of the early twentieth century:2 the traditional party
caucus has been replaced by popularly elected nominating conventions and by the increased use of direct primaries." Justice
Pitney's oft-quoted statement in Newberry u. United StatesU
that "every voter comes to the polls on the day of the general
election confined in his choice to those few candidates who have
received party nomination^"^^ evidences early judicial recognition of the important role political parties and primary elections
play in the electoral process.
Beginning with Wendell Wilkie's attempt to use the 1944
Wisconsin presidential primary as a vehicle for demonstrating
his popular support within the Republican Party, primary competition has become a feature of every presidential election?
Primaries played an especially important role in the campaigns
for the Republican nominations in 1948 (Stassen, Dewey, and
AMERICAN
VOTER64 (1976).
62. States that have passed primary election laws have done so because
"[c]onventions were thought to be susceptible to manipulation by party leaders and a
wide-spread faith existed that more popular participation would have a cleansing effect
AND PRESSURE
GROUPS
409 (5th ed. 1964).
PARTIES
on politics." V. KEY,JR., POLITICS,
Similarly, Robert M. LaFollette, Sr., called for the adoption of the primary, arguing,
No longer . . . will there stand between the voter and the official a political
machine with a complicated system of caucuses and conventions, by the easy
manipulation of which it thwarts the will of the voter and rules of official conduct . . . . If the voter is competent to cast his ballot at the general election
for the official of his choice, he is equally competent to vote directly at the
primary election for the nomination of the candidates of his choice.
Speech by Robert M. LaFollette, Sr., accepting nomination for governor, August 8,1900.
Interestingly, this speech was not quoted in TORRELLE, LAFOLLETTE'S
POLITICAL
P~aosoPHY 36-37 (1920), as reported in LaFollette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 492-93,
287 N.W.2d 519, 527 (1980).
PRIMARY
ELECTIONS
60-67 (1928).
63. C. MEXIAM& R. OVERACKER,
64. 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
65. Id. at 286 (Pitney, J., dissenting).
66. Presidential primaries, of course, have been on the American political scene
longer than this. Their effect on the party nominating process, however, was questionable. In 1912, for example, Theodore Roosevelt won 9 out of 12 primaries yet lost his
race against President William Howard Taft for the Republican Party nomination.
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Taft), 1952 (Eisenhower and Taft), 1964 (Goldwater and Rockefeller), 1976 (Ford and Reagan), and 1980 (Reagan and Bush);
and the Democratic nominations in 1952 (Kefauver? Russell,
and Truman-supported favorite sons), 1956 (Stevenson and
Kefauver), 1960 (Kennedy and Humphrey), 1968 (McCarthy,
Kennedy, and Johnson-supported favorite sons), 1972 (McGovern, Humphrey, Muskie, Wallace and Jackson), 1976 (Carter
and Udall) and 1980 (Carter and Kennedy)."
Moreover, it is clear that the winners of the Democratic and
Republican Party nominations are historically the only viable
candidates for election to the presiden~y.~~
Professor R. A. Dahl,
writing in 1964, noted the dominance of the two-party system
with respect to both the executive and legislative branches:
Since 1860 every presidential election has been won by either a Democrat or a Republican; in only four presidential
elections during that period has a third party ever cairied a
single state. . . . Since 1862 one of the two parties has always
had a clear majority of seats in the House; in the Senate, independents or third party members have prevented a clear majority during a total of ten years. The number of seats held by
third party members is almost always extremely low.70

Nomination by a recognized party substantially reduces the
scope of a citizen's real choice in the general election. Today, the
nomination process is controlled by voting in the primary elections (and caucuses). Theodore H. White has appraised the im67. In 1952, Senator Kefauver won 12 of the 16 presidential primaries, yet the nomination went to Senator Adlai E. Stevenson, who had entered no primaries.
68. For the official primary returns from 1948-1972, see CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY,
332-49 (1975). For the 1976 primary returns, see CONGRESGUIDETO U.S. ELECTIONS
SIONAL QUARTERLY,
POLITICS
IN AMERICA
142-47 (1979).
69. Indeed, the District of Columbia Circuit recently recognized this phenomenon:
Regular presidential contests between the Republican and Democratic parties
began,in 1852. However, the present Democratic Party can trace its origins to
the Democratic Republican Party which Thomas Jefferson began to assemble
even before the end of Washington's first term. H. BONE,AMERICAN
POLITICS
AND THE PARTY
SYSTEM,
28-30 (1971). A case can likewise be made that Hamilton's Federalists and subsequently the Whig Party were the predecessors of
PARTIES
AND ELECTIONS
205
the present Republican Party. E. S m , AMERICAN
(1927). If so, then the only Presidents who may plausibly claim not to be the
products of the two-party rivalry are James Monroe and John Quincy Adams,
who served during a sort of party "interregnum" after the decline of the Federalists and before the rise of the Whigs. See Bone, supra, at 28.
Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 581, n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en
banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
70. R. DAHL,PLURALIST
DEMOCRACY
I N THE UNITED
STATES214 (1967).
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portance of the primary election this way:
Primaries had already thus become, by 1972, one of the
great drive engines of American politics-for a primary is a
deed. All else in politics, except money, is words--comment,
rhetoric, analysis, polls. But a primary is a fact. There is a
hardness to such a fact, especially if the victory is a contested
one. With the lift of such an event, a candidate can compel
attention, build votes, change minds. It is the underdog's classic route to power in America."

Presidential primaries should be viewed for what they actually are, integral parts of the general election, controlling the
choices of those who have the right to vote. Because of this determinative role, primary outcomes should be truly representative of all the voters, not merely of avowed party members. A
recent but single United States Supreme Court case interferes
with this position.

A. The LaFollette Case
In Democratic Party of the United States v. LaFollette,"
the Supreme Court considered a challenge by the National Democratic Party to Wisconsin's open primary law." The Wisconsin
law permits all qualified voters to cast ballots in the presidential
preference primary regardless of their party affiliation. Wisconsin delegates to the national convention are selected by party
members at statewide party caucuses, but they are bound by
state statute to vote in accordance with the preferences expressed in the primary. However, this open primary approach
conflicts with the rules of the Democratic Party which decree
that only those persons who openly and publicly declare their
adherence to the principles of the Democratic Party may participate in the party's presidential preference primary. The National Party argued that as a result of Wisconsin's failure to restrict its Democratic primary to publicly declared party
members, the popularity of various candidates within the party
was distorted. The Party further argued that the binding open
71. T. WHITE,
THE MAKING
OF THE PRESIDENT
1972 at 71 (1973).
72. 101 S. Ct. 1010 (1981).
73. The "open primary" is so named because the "voter is not required to declare
publicly a party preference or to have that preference publicly recorded. Each voter
makes a choice of party in the privacy of the voting booth." 93 Wis. 2d at 485, 287
N.W.2d at 523.
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primary would "infringe severely on the Democratic Party's effort to conduct its affairs."74
A divided Court, speaking through Justice Stewart, ruled
that Wisconsin could not bind the Democratic Party to honor
the results of the open primary at its national convention. Justice Stewart found that the "issue is whether the state may compel the National Party to seat a delegation chosen in a way that
violates the rules of the Party."76 He asserted that resolution of
this issue was controlled by the Court's decision in Cousins v.
W i g o d ~There,
. ~ ~ the Court held that the 1972 Democratic National Convention had the right to refuse to seat an Illinois delegation that was chosen in accordance with state law but that violated party rules regarding participation of minorities, women
and young people. In LaFollette, the Court found that "the
members of the National Party, speaking through their rules,
chose to define their associational rights by limiting those who
could participate in the processes leading to the selection of delBecause of this the Court
egates to the National C~nvention."~~
concluded that "a State, or a court, may not constitutionally
substitute its judgment for that of the Party."78
The Court's analysis is seriously defective on two counts.
First, the emphasis placed on Cousins is inappropriate. Indeed,
as Justice Powell recognized in dissent, "[Tlhe facts of this case
present issues that differ considerably from those we dealt with
in Cousins."7s In Cousins the Court was concerned that the delegates who vote on party rules and procedure, adopt a party platform, and vote for party officers be party members chosen in
accordance with party rules and not a court order. There, "suffrage was exercised at the primary election to elect delegates to a
In LaFollet te the selection of inNational Party Con~ention."~~
dividual delegates to the National Convention was not at issue
because the delegate selection process was under the exclusive
control of the Democratic Party. Wisconsin law provides that
.
74. Brief for Appellants at 33, Democratic Party of the United States v. LaFollette,
101 S. Ct. 1010 (1981).
75. Democratic Party of the United States v. LaFollette, 101 S. Ct. at 1018.
76. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
77. 101 S. Ct. at 1019.
78. Id. at 1020. Justice Stewart merely restated the question at issue, and then used
the question as a "reason." A conclusion is not a reason, even when uttered by a Supreme Court Justice.
79. Id. at 1022. (Powell, J., dissenting).
80. 419 U.S. 477, 489 (1975).
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the "method of selecting the delegates or alternates [is] determined by the state party organization.'"' No delegates are selected by the voter in Wisconsin. Once a delegate is elected,
through whatever manner or process, Wisconsin law requires
only that the delegate "vote in accord with the results of the
open primary election."82 As Justice Powell noted, "While this
regulation affecting participation in the primary is hardly insignificant, it differs substantially from the direct state interference
in delegate selection at issue in C o u ~ i n s . " ~ ~
Secondly, in an opinion which exalts form over substance,
Justice Stewart, under the guise of associational rights, has given
the two major parties a blank check to make rules for themselves and for all others affected by the parties' rules. In finding
that "a State or a court may not constitutionally substitute its
own judgment for that of a party,"" the Court has gone much
too far in protecting the right of association. It has in practical
effect, permitted those who control the major parties to make
rules for all Americans. When the actions of any association
have such a profound and far-reaching effect, not only on the
group itself, but upon a state (as in LaFollette) and, indeed,
upon the nation as a whole, members of the association should
be held to have duties beyond that of looking out for their own
protected rights. The National Democratic Party performs a significant public86function every four years when it selects one of
the two major candidates for President of the United States.
81. Wrs. STAT.ANN. 5 8.12(3)(b) (WESTSUPP.1980).
82. Democratic Party of the United States v. LaFollette, 101 S. Ct. 1010, 1014
(1981).
83. Id. at 1023. (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 1020. Justice Stewart offers no authority in support of this contention. He
further states: "A political party's choice among the various ways of determining the
make-up of a State's delegation to the party's national convention is protected by the
Constitution." Id. Again, Stewart faila to cite authority for support or on point. Instead,
he refers to Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 585 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976). That is hardly dispositive, particularly
since Stewart designated it as a "cf."
85. The public nature of the primary is the extent to which public money is used in
the primary process. The Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, 26
U.S.C. $3 9031-9042 (1976), provides limited public financing of presidential primary
elections by authorizing federal matching payments for certain contributions to eligible
candidates. The Act establishes a separate account within the United States Treasury
known as the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account from which the Secretary of the Treasury transfers funds to candidates whom the Federal Election Commission certifies are eligible to receive such funds. As of February 26, 1981, a total of
$31,309,062.16 had been certified to ten presidential candidates eligible to receive federal
primary matching funds.

2751

EQUAL PROTECTION

291

The Democratic Party is not a mere "private club"86 primarily
concerned, like the NAACP, with the associational rights of its
members. When, as has become obvious, early presidential
primaries (as in New Hampshire) and even party caucuses (as in
Iowa) can have significant national ramifications-mainly, it
seems, because of the mass media-then the privateness of the
"political associations" should give way to clear recognition of
their public, indeed national, status. This is what Justice Stewart in his majority opinion failed to perceive," and what, therefore, makes his opinion and the decision faulty.88
Voting is the first duty of democracy. Indeed, the Founding
86. 93 Wis. 2d at 515, 287 N.W.2d at 538.
87. Justice White, as a result of his association with the 1960 campaign of President
Kennedy, and Chief Justice Burger, as a result of his association with the 1948 presidential campaign of Harold Stassen, are the only members of the current Court with even
minimal national political experience. It has been suggested that
[i]n matters of political structure and process, . judges properly give
deference to legislators whose work requires them to be in the thick of active
political engagement. For when judges, particularly those appointed for life,
come to questions of political process, they almost by definition do not have
the benefit of current experience.
L. REV. 345, 380 (1977). To illusLeventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 COLUM.
trate the point, Judge Leventhal noted,
In 1916, Felix Frankfurter observed that Charles Evans Hughes, although
a former governor, was waging a commonplace political campaign that was utterly lacking in distinction, a condition that he thought was in part due to the
different nature of the intervening assignment on the Supreme Court where he
had served with distinction.
Id.
88. LaFollette also presents the interesting question of whether the assocational
rights of the National Party transcend those of the State Party. As Justice Powell
pointed out: "It is significant that the Democratic Party of Wisconsin, which represents
those citizens of Wisconsin willing to take part publicly in party affairs, is here defending the state law." 101 S. Ct. 1010, 1024 (Powell, J., dissenting). The State Party, originally named in the action as respondent with the National Party, responded by agreeing
that the state law may be validly applied against it and the National Party. The State
Party thenocross-claimedagainst the National Party and asked the court to recognize its
delegation selected in accord with Wisconsin law. The State Party also filed papers in
support of the Wisconsin law with the Supreme Court.
The Wisconsin law also had the support of the Democratic controlled state legislature. On September 5,1979, by a unanimous vote of the state senate and a 92-1 vote of
its assembly, the Wisconsin legislature by joint resolution supported the "firm and enduring commitment of the people of Wisconsin to the open presidential preference primary law as an integral element of Wisconsin's proud tradition of direct and effective
participatory democracy." Democratic Party v. LaFollette, Docket No. 79-1631 (February 25, 1981) (Joint Appendix at 75-78). Moreover, on September 14, 1979, a bill intended to create a modified closed primary was firmly rejected in committee. 93 Wis. 2d
at 490 n.14, 287 N.W.2d at 526 n.14.

..
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Fatherss9 recognized that "[a] fundamental principle of our representative democracy is," in Alexander Hamilton's words,
" 'that the people should choose whom they please to govern
them.'
As stated by James Madison:

.

As each representative will be chosen by a greater number
of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be
more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success
the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and
the suffrage of the people being more free will be more likely to
centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the
most diffusive and established characters."

Not only does the Court's approach in LaFollette, with its
emphasis on the associational rights of party members, seemingly ignore the importance of the vote in a democracy, but it
runs counter to the Court's traditionally vigilant interest in protecting the right of the voting franchise against state or party
the
abridgment. One hundred years ago in Ex parte Siebold,@%
Supreme Court held that Congress may enact statutes which
protect every citizen against state interference with the right to
vote. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins," the Court recognized that "the
political franchise of voting" was a "fundamental political
right,"94 preservative of all other individual rights. During the
past two decades the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized
the significance of a citizen's right to vote and has vigorously
protected it against infringement in any form. In 1964 in Reynolds v. S i ~ n s , the
@ ~ Court stated,
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a
free and democratic society. Especially since thd right to exer89. The wisdom and expectations of the drafters of the Constitution have served as
a foundation for the continued expansion of popular suffrage. Thus,six of the last twelve
amendments to the Constitution have extended the elective franchise by restricting limitations thereon and expanding the ambit of protected participation. Amendment XV
(race, color and previous condition of servitude); Amendment XVII (senatorial elections); Amendment XIX (women's suffrage); Amendment XXIII (District of Columbia);
Amendment XXIV (abolition of the poll tax); Amendment XXVI (18 year-old right to
vote).
90. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (quoting Alexander Hamilton,
from 2 DEBATES
ON THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION
257 (J. Elliot ed. 1876)).
NO. 10 (J. Madison), at 58 (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
91. niE FEDERALIST
92. 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
93. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
94. Id. at 370.
95. 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). Although technically dicta, subsequent citation has
made the Court's language an accurate statement of law.
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cise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully
and meticulously scrutini~ed.~

The Court decided Wesberry u. Sandersa7 that same year and
observed that "[nlo right is more precious in a free country than
that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws
under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even
the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is ~ndermined."~~
Two years later, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,@@
the Court declared the right to vote to be one of the fundamental rights protected by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and concluded that "classifications which
might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and
carefully confined."loOSubsequent cases have amplified and considerably broadened these holdings in applying them to specific
circumstances.101Moreover, it is no longer open to serious question that the right to vote in a primary election is as protected
against state encroachment as is the right to vote in the general
election.
The early attitude of the Supreme Court toward the status
of primary elections may be gleaned from Newberry u. United
States.lo2There the Court found that
[primaries] are in no sense elections for an office, but merely
methods by which party adherents agree upon candidates
whom they intend to offer and support for ultimate choice by
all qualified electors. General provisions touching elections in
constitutions or statutes are not necessarily applicable to
primaries-the two things are radically different.los

The Court held that article I, section 4 of the Constitution, giving Congress power to regulate the manner of holding elections
for the House of Representatives and the Senate, did not em96. Id. at 561-62 (1964).
97. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
98. Id. at 17.
99. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
100. Id. at 670.
101. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residence requirement for voting found unconstitutional); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395
U.S. 621 (1969) (a state may not deny the right to vote to a citizen because he does not
own or lease taxable realty).
102. 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
103. Id. at 250.
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power Congress to limit expenditures of candidates in senatorial
primaries.lo4
As late as 1935 primaries were considered, in the absense of
state regulation, to be functions of the political parties, which
were recognized as private associations. In Grovey v. Townsend,lo5 the Court held that the decision of the Convention of
the Texas Democratic Party to exclude all blacks from participating in the Democratic primary did not constitute state action
and therefore was not prohibited by either the fourteenth or the
fifteenth amendments. This ruling came despite the Court's earlier decisions in Nixon u. Herndon106and Nixon v. Condon.lo7In
Herndon a Texas law declaring blacks ineligible to vote in the
Democratic primary was held to violate the fourteenth amendment. In Condon a subsequent Texas statute which likewise excluded blacks by allowing the Democratic Party executive committee to determine its voting membership was also found to
violate the equal protection clause. In neither Herndon nor Condon, however, did the Court define "primary" as part of the
electoral process.
The judicial view represented by Grovey underwent a radical change beginning with United States v. Classic.lo8The Court
there overruled its decisions in Newberry and Grovey and held
that the right to vote in a primary election was entitled to the
same amount of protection from state abridgement as the right
to vote in a general election:
Where the state law has made the primary an integral part of
the procedure of choice, or where in fact the primary effectively controls the choice, the right of the elector to have his
ballot counted at the primary, is likewise included in the right
protected by Article I, § 2. And this right of participation is
protected just as is the right to vote at the election, where the
primary is by law made an integral part of the election machinery, whether the voter exercises his right in a party primary
104. Substantial disagreement with this point was expressed by the concurring Justices. Four Justices would have held that Congress had the power to regulate primary
elections selecting senatorial nominees. Id. at 267-68 (White, C.J., concurring in part);
Id. at 291 (Pitney, J., concurring in part, joined by Brandeis and Clarke, J.J.). One Justice reserved the question. Id. at 258 (McKenna, J., concurring, but reserving the question of Congress' power under the seventeenth amendment).
105. 295 US. 45 (1935).
106. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
107. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
108. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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which invariably, sometimes or never determines the ultimate
choice of the representative.'Oe

Three years later in Smith v. A l l ~ r i g h (the
t ~ ~ third
~
of the
quartet of cases commonly referred to as the "White Primary"
cases),ll1 the Supreme Court recognized the significance of the
primary and the interest of each voter in effective political participation at this decisive stage of the electoral process. In Smith
the Court held that the exclusion of blacks from the Texas Democratic primaries was state action in violation of the fifteenth
amendment. Specifically overruling Grouey, the Court finally
concluded that "the right to vote in . . a primary for the nomination of candidates without discrimination by the State, like
the right to vote in a general election, is a right secured by the
C o n s t i t ~ t i o n . "The
~ ~ ~ Court later extended constitutional protections to voters in "unofficial" primaries. In Terry u. A d a r n ~ ~ ~ ~
the Court scrutinized an association of qualified white Democratic voters which selected candidates who would then run for
nomination in the official Democratic primary in Texas. The
Court held that exclusion of blacks was invalid under the
fifteenth amendment because they were not permitted to participate in a significant stage of the electoral process114 -"the
sole stage of the electoral process where the bargaining and interplay of rival political forces would make [the blacks' vote]
count." Although Smith and Terry were not fourteenth amendment cases, the principle is clear. Our argument herein merely
takes the Terry principle one step further. Just as the exclusion
from the primary election stage, where effective formation and
compromise take place, denied the blacks their fifteenth amendment rights, we suggest that closed primary systems (such as
Florida's) operate to exclude unaftiliated voters from the determinative "primary" stage of the electoral process,l16 and thus in-

.

109. Id. at 318.
110. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
111. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 US. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
112. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. at 661-62.
113. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
114. Id. at 484 (plurality opinion of Clark, J., concurring, joined by Vinson, C.J.,
Reed and Jackson, J.J.).
115. Although to our knowledge no data exist, if it could be shown that a significant
number of independent voters are either black or members of other minority groups, the
extension of equal protection analysis to the rights of independents to vote in primary
elections could be seen merely as the application of the standard adopted by the Court
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volve an equal protection dimension.
The essence of the White Primary decisions is the premise
that determination of who can be voted for in the general election is as important, or more important, as who will be voted for
in that election. As Justice Pitney has stated, "The likelihood of
a candidate succeeding in an election without a party nomination is practically negligible . . As a practical matter, the ultimate choice of the mass of voters is predetermined when the
nominations have been made."l16 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has recently noted the winnowing process inherent in primary
elections and its importance in a full election cycle. In Storer v.
Brown,l17 the Court upheld the state's move to guarantee that
the primary election process reduce the number of candidates in
the general election. Sustaining a state law that refused to permit defeated primary election candidates to get on the general
election ballot via a third party candidacy, the Court reasoned,

..

The direct party primary in California is not merely an exercise or warm-up for the general election but an integral part of
the entire election process, the initial stage in a two-stage process by which the people choose their public officers. It functions to winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen
candidated ls

The right of citizens to vote in primaries was aptly described by
the Third Circuit in Lynch v. Torq~ato:~~@
[Tlhe citizen's constitutional right to equality as an elector

. . . applies to the choice of those who shall be his elected rep-

resentatives in the conduct of government, not in the internal
management of political party. It is true that this right extends
to state regulated and party conducted primaries. However,
this is because the function of primaries is to select nominees
for governmental office even though, not because, they are
party enterprises. The people, when engaged in primary and
general elections for the selection of their representatives in
government, may rationally be viewed as the 'state' in action,
with the consequence that the organization and regulation of
these enterprises must be such as accord each elector equal
in the "White Primary" cases.
116. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 286 (1921) (Pitney, J., concurring in
part).
117. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
118. Id. at 735. See also Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715-16 (1974).
119. 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965).
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Although most of the cases in this series121dealt with black
voting rights, the underlying principle is that the same set of
rules which govern the conduct of the general election should
also operate in the regulation of the nomination process. That
means that the spirit of the fifteenth amendment should be read
into the equal protection clause and be applied generally. It is
valid to maintain that the Court has at least tacitly recognized
that the right to vote may be rendered meaningless in the absence of a correlative right to participate in the nominating process by which candidates are selected.
It is clear that the presidential primary is far more than a
mere warm-up for the general election. It is an integral part of
the entire selection process-the beginning of a two stage process. It functions to winnow out and finally reject all but the
chosen candidates for the November election. But this is done in
the closed primary states without allowing all voters to participate. Voters who choose to remain unatliated are barred from
the most important ballot box, rendering their opportunity in
the general election, as in November 1980, an empty charade.
The question is whether that is desirable and also whether it
jibes with the Constitution. The answer on both counts should
be in the negative, both for purposes of policy and, for constitutional reasons. The right to vote can only mean the right to cast
a meaningful ballot-something not now possible in Florida and
other closed primary states, and something wrongfully limited
by LaFollette.

B. Reasons for Enfranchisement
Three important arguments stand out in favor of opening
primaries to all eligible voters, regardless of their willingness to
declare party atliation. The first, a practical observation, arises
from an increasing political independence in this nation. The
second finds root in considerations of our right to privacy. The
third is that closed primary systems are unjustifiably
120. Id. at 372.
121. In addition to the judicial decisions discussed above, Congress enacted two
pieces of legislation which had the effect of removing restrictions on the franchise: the
Voting Rights Act of 1%5, Pub. L. No. 89-110,79 Stat. 437 (codified in 42 U.S.C. 9s 1971
to 1973bb-1 (1976)), and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91285, 84 Stat. 314 (amending 42 U.S.C. $9 1973b, 1973c, 1973aa to 1973bb-4 (1970)
(amended and repealed in part, 1975)).
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discriminatory.
1. Increasing political independence. Many Americans are
"issue-oriented," and for that reason are not party followers.laa
Since John F. Kennedy's success in 1960, the personality and
"media image" of political candidates dominate over political
party labels. Presidential candidates are marketed through television by advertising specialists. As political analyst David
Broder observed in 1972, "Television and radio enable wellfinanced candidates to go directly into the homes of voters far
more effectively than even the most well-organized political machine."laS There is strong evidence that the parties are weakening."' Indeed, recent polls have indicated a steady rise in the
number of voters who consider themselves independent.laS
Fewer than fifty percent of the eligible voters voted for either
Ronald Reagan or Jimmy Carter in 1980. Moreover, the national
party-affiliated voters increasingly split tickets in general elections-a sign of weakened party loyalty and increased voter independence. This trend is documented in an electoral study
which illustrates "defection rates" for those who profess aftiliation with a political party.la6 Justice Powell, in his dissenting
122. D. BRODER,
THE PARTY'SOVER(1972). "Seen as not relevant, parties are bypassed with the voters making their choices on the basis of their own issue preferences
VOTERS'CHOICE183 (1975). See also E. L ~ D ,
and those of the candidates." G. POMPER,
JR.& C. HADLEY,
TRANSFORMATIONS
OF THE AMERICAN
PARTY
SYSTEM
301 (1975) (parties
are perceived as less than needed by the contemporary electorate). Many voters go beyond merely viewing political parties as irrelevant, but actually distrust them. See A.
RANNEY,
CURINGTHE MISCHIEFSOF FACTION
56 (1973); G. POMPBR,VOTER'SCHOICE183
(1975).
THE PARTY'SOVER239-40 (1972). The Supreme Court in Buckley
123. D. BRODER,
recognized the "electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass
media for news and information.'' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 19.
124. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 531-32, n.18 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(citing Burnham, The 1976 Election: Has the Crisis Been Adjourned in AMERICAN
P o ~ r n c sAND PUBLIC
POLICY
19-22 (W. Burnham & W. Weinberg eds. 1976); D. BRODER,
THE PARTY'SO m 239-40 (1972); Herbers, The Party's Over for the Political Parties,
N.Y.T i e s , Dec. 9, 1979, 8 6 (Magazine), at 159; Pomper, The Decline of the Party in
American Elections, 92 POL.SOC. Q. 21, 40-41 (1977)).
125. Perhaps this is also caused by the lack of discernible differences in ideology
between the major parties. "Political parties in this country traditionally have been characterized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and membership." Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 769 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting). Three Justices joined Powell in the
dissent.
126. N. NIE, S. VERB&,
& J. PeTRocuc, THE CHANGING
AMERICAN
VOTER52 (1976).
Similarly, a 1952 survey reported 74% of the electorate as party regulars in voting for
state and local offices. By 1974, however, that percentage had dropped to 42%. E. L ~ D ,
JR.& C. Hmm, TRANSFORMATION
OF THE AMERICAN
PARTY
SYSTEM
293-96 (1975).
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opinion in Rosario v. Rockefeller,ln recognized the trend toward
greater voter independence: "Partisan political activities do not
constantly engage the attention of large numbers of Americans,
especially as party labels and loyalties tend to be less persuasive
than issues and qualities of individual candidates."la8 In sum,
the voter evaluates candidates on the basis of information and
impressions conveyed by the mass media, and "acts as an individual, not a member of c~llectivity."~~~
2. Right to privacy. Another important reason for abolishing
the closed primary system is that it violates the constitutional
right to privacylS0and secrecy of the ballot by forcing voters to
declare publicly their party preferences. It is clear that
[olne simple recognition of privacy's importance to selfgovernance is the curtain on the voting booth. But the shelter
of privacy is needed for more than the casting of the formal
vote, both because there are other ways of registering self-governing choices and because the process of reaching a decision
does not take place only a t the moment of formal choice registering; it is a continuous process which extends from the receipt of each item of information from a speaker to each
choice, formal or informal, which the citizen registers. He who
performs his listening and deciding functions in a glass house
is coerced by public opinion, whether anyone is actually looking in or not. If every magazine he reads, every rally he attends, every person he speaks to might somehow become a
matter of public knowledge, he would feel inhibiting pressure.
The pressure is the same as that felt by a member of the
NAACP in Alabama when he fears that the fact of his membership will be publicized.lS1

Yet, in a closed primary system, the names of publicly declared
127. 410 US. 752 (1973). In Rosario the Court merely held that a state may establish a public declaration of party affiliation as a prerequisite to voting in a party primary
in order to prevent raiding.
128. Id. a t 771 (Powell, J., dissenting).
129. Note, The Constitutionality of Non-Member Voting, in Political Primary
L.J. 259, 289 (1978), (citing N. NIE, S. VERBA,J. PETROCIK,
Elections, 14 WILLAMET~E
THECHANGING
A ~ R I C AVOTER
N
347 (1976)).
130. See, e.g., West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US. 624 (1943) (declaring that
a state statute compelling each public school student to pledge allegiance to the flag
violated the first amendment). The Court stated, "[Ilf there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein." Id. at 642.
131. Note, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALEL.J. 1466-67 (1973).
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voters appear on a "poll list" of a particular political party.
These poll lists are public documents and as such, are available
both for public inspection and sale.lS2It is not surprising that
many people are unwilling to declare party preference because of
fear of undue pressure or harassment from employers, business
associates, social acquaintances or opposing party members.lM
In the few states, including Wisconsin, where the legislatures have adopted an open primary system, voters are not required to state publicly a party preference. Each voter makes a
choice of party in the privacy of the voting booth. It is this important essence of the system, rather than its particular form,
that characterizes the open primary. As the Wisconsin Supreme
Court recognized, "It is
the 'private declaration' of party
preference in the voting booth, as compared with a public, recorded declaration, that characterizes the Wisconsin presidential
preference vote as an open primary."la
In guaranteeing a private primary ballot, the open primary
law serves an interest fundamental to democracy-privacy of political preferences and convictions.136 Indeed, this right of privacy was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Buckley

...

132. At least one court has observed that compiling lists of supporters and nonsupporters for campaigning, polling, patronage and other uses may be very helpful to a political organization. Nader v. SchafTer, 417 F. Supp. 837,848 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'dmem.,
424 U.S. 989 (1976). See also C. MERIUAM
& H. GOSNELL,
THEAMERICANPARTY
SYSTEM
288 (1940).
For a good discussion of compelled disclosure through poll lists, see Skornicka, State
Action in Presidential Candidate Selection, 1976 U. WIS. L. REV.1269, 1296-97.
133. In LaFo22ette two independent voters filed an amici curiae brief with the
United States Supreme Court. James MacDonald and Elliott Maraniss presented the
"interests of independent voters who wish to participate in presidential primaries, but
who decline to afEliate with an organized party." Brief of Amici Curiae James MacDonald and Elliott Maraniss Urging Affirmance at 2, Democratic Party v. LaFollette, Docket
No. 79-1631 (February 25, 1981). Both Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Maranks have been
independent voters for nearly twenty years. Neither can wholeheartedly support the
goals of either major party. As a journalist wishing to maintain impartiality, the interest
of Mr. Maraniss in not publicly affiliating with a major party is particularly compelling.
134. LaFollette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 485, 287 N.W.2d. 519, 523
(1980).
For a discussion of this and a detailed analysis of the open primary, see Comment,
The Constitutionality of Non-Member Voting in Political Primary Elections, 14 WmLAMEW
L.J. 259 (1978); Comment, Open Versus Closed Primaries: A Dilemma in the
Illinois Election Process, 1977 S. ILL. L.J. 210.
135. The Court has long held fundamental the right of privacy of association and
beliefs. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960).
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u. Valeo.lM There, the Court found this right to be "fundamental in a free society," and the advent of the secret ballot to be
"one of the great political reforms."137 The Buckley Court, in
discussing the disclosure requirements of the Federal Election
Campaign A d of 1971,lS8recognized that compelled disclosure
"can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment."13@Drawing from a long line of
cases invalidating various disclosure requirements,140 the Court
established a balancing test between the infringement of first
amendment rights and the governmental interest asserted. As
applied here, the burden that compelled disclosure imposes on
the independent primary voter must be balanced against the associational interests of the national party and its members or
the general interests of the state.
What societal interest does a closed primary further? It is
by no means clear that any such group interest, as opposed to
associational interest, is served by the closed primary. Since primary elections are an integral part of the electoral process, they
must be held to a standard of serving the large interest of all
people rather than a small group of people who call themselves
Democrats or Republicans.
Even though advocates of a closed primary would argue that
an open primary permits non-party members to have a significant effect on the selection of a Democrat or Republican presidential candidate141and that the open primary therefore violates
136. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
137. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 237 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
138. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(1972), has been amended as follows: Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,88 Stat. 1263 (1974); Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,90 Stat. 475; Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1655; Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1980). The Act is codified as
amended beginning at 2 U.S.C. 5 431.
139. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).
140. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); and NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
141. One writer states that a political party may advance its own and its supporters'
ideology through the nomination of a candidate and that this freedom would be meaningless if parties could not determine that ideology. Note, Presidential Nominating Conventions: Party Rules, State Law and the Constitution, 62 GEO. L.J. 1621, 1626-27
(1974). Another commentator argues that because a major aspect of the primary is the
furtherance of associational interest, the primary election should express the party members' consensus. Note, Primary Elections: The Real Party in Interest, 27 RUTGERSL.
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the constitutionally guaranteed freedom to associate for political
purposes, that is not the critical point. It is true that in Cousins
v. Wigoda,14' Justice Brennan described the protected right of a
major party and its adherents this way:
[Ilts adherents enjoy a constitutionaUy protected right of political association. "There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of
political beliefs and ideas is a form of 'orderly group activity'
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. . . The
right to associate with the political party of one's choice is an
integral part of this basic constitutional freedom."14g

.

The national political party is thus interested in protecting the
integrity of the primary as a party function protecting its associational interests "from intrusion by those with adverse political
principles."144The Constitution and the electoral process it protects speak, however, in terms of the individual's rights as a unit
of what Professor Karst calls a "national citizenship." Permitting all voters to participate in party primaries does not dilute
the right of association one iota. The exact contrary is more accurate. No person, as in Terry u. Adam, is being denied the
right to act collectively with others. All that would be done is to
prevent the collectivity-the party-from discriminating against
those who choose to march alone to the ballot box.
The argument that a contemporaneous, publicly recorded
statement of party preferences is necessary to maintain the integrity of associational rights is therefore specious. The Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly observed that this objection is dependent upon two unsupported assumptions: "[Flirst, that
voters who do not have a commonality of interest with the party
will attempt to vote on the party ballot in sufEcient numbers to
jeopardize the primary's integrity; and second, that a contemporaneous declaration of party preference is a necessary and effective way of preventing this result."146 I t should be noted that a
national party has the burden of persuading the court that a
REV.298, 306 (1974). Parties, however, are "mere vague electoral alliances." L. THUROW,
THEZERO-SUM
SOCIETY
212 (1980).
142. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
143. Id. at 487. See also the concurring opinion of Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, and
Chief Justice Burger at 491.
144. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1952).
145. LaFollette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 495, 287 N.W.2d 519, 533
(1980).
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particular state statute infringes upon a national party's associational rights.146 Analysis of the closed primary indicates that
such a system cannot support a compelling societal interest, and,
on the other hand, the open primary system protects vital individual interests.
There are three categories of voters who may be charged as
not having a commonality of interest with a national party. One
such category is made up of "raiders." "Raiding" has been defined by the Supreme Court as "the practice whereby voters in
sympathy with one party vote in another's primary in order to
distort that primary's results."147 Raiding, when it occurs,
presents a serious problem because it "is an act hostile to the
party; it amounts to a fraud on the party. It deprives the party
and its members of the purpose of their association."148 Yet,
documented instances of raiding are relatively rare". and are
not a significant problem or serious threat to party integrity. Indeed, the National Democratic Party has acknowledged that
there is no real evidence to show the existence of raiding.lS0
146. Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191, 195 (1979). See also American Party of
Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 790 (1974).
147. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973).
148. 93 Wis. 2d at 506, 287 N.W.2d a t 532. In 1910 the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
upholding its open primary law, commented on raiding: "That any considerable following of one political creed will deliberately desert their own party at the primary to foist
an unworthy set of candidates on a rival party presupposes a degree of moral turpitude
that we cannot presume to exist." Van Alstine v. Frear, 125 N.W. 961, 969 (Wis. 1910).
149. Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARV.L. REV. 1111,1173 (1975) (''Although there are documented cases of organized raiding [citing no cases after 19501, the
recent decline of party machines capable of inducing their members to raid and the absence of durational requirements in many states suggest that the likelihood of raiding
may be overstated.")
Indeed, raiding is not a serious threat. See Skornicka, State Action in Presidential
Candidate Selection, 1976 WIS. L. REV.1269, 1301-03; Democratic Party of the United
States v. LaF'ollette, 101 S. Ct. 1010,1026 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting). See also LaFollette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 495 n.32, 287 N.W.2d 519, 533 n.32, (1980),
citing Note, The Constitutionality of Non-Member Voting in Primary Elections, 14
WIU~~ME~TE
L.J. 259, 282-86 (1978); Adamany, Communication: Cross-Over Voting and
the Democratic Party's Reform Rules, 70 AM. POL.SCI.REV. 536, 538 (1976); Note, Pn'mary Elections: The Real Party in Interest, 27 RUTGERS
L. REV. 298, 307 n.74 (1974);
Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARV.L. REV.1111,1172-73(1975); Note, ConL. REV. 147,
stitutional Issues in Durational Party AffiliationRequirements, 25 MAINE
154 (1973).
150. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON PRESIDENTIAL
NOMINATION
AND PARTY
STRUCTURE,OPENNESS,
AND PARTY
BUILDING:
REFORMS
FOR A STRONGER
DEMOPARTICIPATION
CRATIC PARTY
68 (1978) (Winograd Commission) ("Some have argued the Republicans
'raid' Democratic primaries. However, the existence of 'raiding' has never been conclusively proven by survey research.").
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A second category of voters presumably not possessing a
commonality of interest with a party are adherents to the alternative national party or other parties. These are the "crossover"
voters. Theoretically, the closed primary prevents members of
one political party from voting on the rival party's ballot-a not
uncommon occurrence and allegedly harmful under the open
primary system. Thus, the Democratic Party opposes open
primaries because of a concern that that delegation allocated according to the primary results would not fairly reflect the division of preferences among "Democratic identifiers in the electorate."lS1 Yet, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded in
analyzing data submitted by the Democratic Party, "Wisconsin's
open primary produces an electorate which is as representative
(or as unrepresentative) of 'Democratic identifiers in the electorate' as is the electorate produced by closed primaries and
caucuses which are acceptable to the National Party."ls9
Additionally, it seems clear from the Wisconsin experience
that when a member of one party decides to cross over and vote
in another party's primary, the vote is cast out of a desire to
express principled support for a particular presidential candidate. In 1968, for example, Wisconsin Republicans voted for
Senator Eugene McCarthy in the Democratic primary. Political
scientist Austin Ranney described the crossover voters this way:
[They] deserted their party to register their special approval of a candidate, or policy associated with a candidate,
available only in the other party. [Eugene] McCarthy's Republican supporters clearly did not vote for him because they
thought he would be the easiest Democrat for Nixon to beat in
November; they did so because they liked him and his opposition to the Vietnam War.lSs
151. LaFollette v. Democratic Party,93 Wis. 2d at 508, 287 N.W.2d at 534.
152. Id. The court's conclusion is also supported by past experience in the Wisconsin primary. In 1968 Senator Eugene McCarthy won the Wisconsin Democratic primary.
In 1972 Senator George McGovern won the Wisconsin primary and went on to win the
Democratic nomination on the first ballot. Similarly, in 1976 and 1980, Jimmy Carter
won the Wisconsin Democratic primary and the nomination of the Democratic primary.
On the Republican side, Richard Nixon won both the Wisconsin primary and the
Republican nomination in 1968 and 1972. Similarly, both Gerald Ford in 1976, and Ronald Reagan in 1980 won the Wisconsin primary and the Republican nomination.
In short, the winners of the Wisconsin open primary seem to be reflective of the
views of their respective political parties as confirmed by the national nominating conventions and are not some sort of aberrant.
153. Ranney, Turnout and Representation in Presidential Primary Elections, 66
AM. POL.SCI.REV.35 (1972).
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Studies of the Wisconsin open primary indicate that a small percentage of the total primary voters were persons who chose to
vote in the other party's primary.'" Moreover, the studies
demonstrate that the statewide result of the primary election
was not affected by Republican crossover voting, even though
the vote was admittedly diluted.156Justice Powell, dissenting in
Rosario u. Rockefeller,lw summed up the reasons for voting in
the other party's primary when he wrote:
Citizens generally declare or alter party d i a t i o n for reasons
quite unconnected with any premeditated intention to disrupt
or frustrate the plans of a party with which they are not in
sympathy. Citizens customarily choose a party and vote in
[the] primary simply because it presents candidates and issues
more responsive to their immediate concerns and
aspiration^.^"

A third possible category of voters who do not have a commonality of interest are the "independents."158 The declaration
of preference required by a closed primary appears to be no
more effective than the open primary in deterring the participation of independent voters. Indeed, some studies suggest that in
closed primary systems, some voters who consider themselves independent enroll or register as party members to vote in the primary of their choice,lSeIt seems clear that voters who do not
share a commonality of interest with a political party will not
vote on that party's ballot in sufficient numbers to jeopardize
the primary's integrity. Even if this were to occur, however, the
closed primary is an unnecessary and ineffective way of preventing this result.
In Rule 2A of its Delegate Selection Rules for the 1980 Convention, the Democratic Party regulates participation in the
delegate selection process by defining Democratic voters as those
persons "who publicly declare their party preference Democratic
and have that preference publicly recorded."lm By implication
154. Hedlund, Cross-Over Voting in a 1976 Open Residential Primary, 41 PUB.

OPIN. Q. 498, 502, 513 (1979).
155. Id. at 502-03.
156. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
157. Id. at 769-70 (Powell, J., dissenting).
158. Those not affiliated or registered with any political party.
159. Note, The Constitutionality of Non-Member Voting in Primary Elections, 14
WILLAME~TE
L.J. 259,277 n.103,288 (1978); Hedlund, Cross-Over Voting in a 1976 Open
Residential Primary, 41 PUB.OPIN. Q. 498, 502, 513 (1979).
160. Delegate Selection Rules for the 1980 Democratic National Convention, Rule 2.
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the party is saying that it does not want independents to participate because they do not share a common interest with voters
who have publicly affiliated themselves with the party.
Yet, under Rule 2A, voters are Democratic voters simply if
they think they are and say they are, even if only for the purpose of voting in one primary election. Indeed, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court noted that "the [Democratic] Party does not set
forth any objective standards against which a voter may test his
or her self-designation. Nor does the National Party set forth
any subjective standards to guide voters in determining their
party preference."ldl Under Rule 2A any person of any political
party or persuasion would be eligible to vote in a Democratic
primary if that person would be willing to a l i a t e with the
Democratic Party for that one primary election. It is difficult to
perceive the increased benefits of associational righta under this
system as opposed to the Wisconsin "open primary" system.lda
"Defining who is and who is not a Republican or Democrat,
defining the commonality of interest which binds Democrats or
Republicans, or defining the Republican's or Democrat's commitment to the party are key issues which have not been resolved by the parties."lq The significance of the declaration of
party preference is far from clear. Indeed, it is uncertain exactly
what membership in a political party signals. Contrary to the
experience of many European democracies and the fears of the
Founding Fathers,'" the formation of political parties in the
United States has not exerted a fragmenting effect upon our political life. The reason for this is that pluralism within parties,
rather than pluralism among parties has been a hallmark of
American politics.
161. LaFollette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d at 505, 287 N.W.2d at 531.
162. Justice Powell keenly points out:
The Wisconsin statute states that "[iln each year in which electors for
president and vice-president are to be elected, the voters of this state shall be
given an opportunity to express their preference for the person to be the presidential candidate of their party." Wis. Stat. 5 8.12(1) (emphasis added). Thus
the act of voting in the Democratic primary fairly can be described as an act of
affiliation with the Democratic Party. The real issue in this case is whether the
party has the right to decide that) only publicly m a t e d voters may
participate.
Democratic Party of the United States v. LaFollette, 101 S. Ct. 1010, 1023 n.2 (1981)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
163. 93 Wis. 2d at 505, 287 N.W.2d at 531.
164. See L. DSTEIN,
POLITICAL
PARTIESIN WESTERN
DEMOCRACIES
(1967); R. D m ,
PLURALIST
DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED
STATES(1967).
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Political parties have been viewed not as ideological refuges
for "true believers," but as groupings of diverse interests joined
together in a coalition for the purpose of achieving shared political goals. Only under such a pragmatic view could men of such
diverse ideologies as George Wallace and the late Allard Lowenstein in the Democratic Party, and Ronald Reagan and Pete McCloskey in the Republican Party, share the same party a l i a tion?' Given such a non-ideological tradition in party politics, it
is not surprising that interparty mobility has been a facet of
American political life. The two major parties with rather nebulous and informal criteria for party membership have, in the
United States, created parties broadly composed of "persons
from all walks of life" and of "all shades of economic and political opinion."lse Thus, it seems that the chief characteristic of
parties is not the commonality of aims among its membership to
be advanced by candidates, but rather, as one court stated, it is
"the direction and control of the struggle for political power
among men who may have contradictory interests and often mutually exclusive hopes of securing them. This the parties do by
institutionalizing the struggle and emphasizing positive measures to create a strong and general agreement on policies."167
Indeed, the intellectual nature of a political party has been characterized this way:
It is not concerned with matters of fact, or doctrine, or even
principle, except as they bear upon the great cause for existence: success at the polls. Such organizations contain not only
men of divergent views; they must also appeal to voters of differing opinions, prejudices and loyalties. It is folly to talk of
finding an actual basis [for political parties] in any set of principles relating to public welfare.lW

The closed primary's contemporaneous declaration of party
preference is an "unnecessary and ineffective way to prevent
raiders, members of an alternative national party, adherents of
165. It is little wonder that the Supreme Court has noted, "Major parties encompass
candidates of great diversity. In many situations the label 'Republican' or 'Democrat'
tells the voter little." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 70 (1976).
AND THE PARTY
SYSTEM
284 (1955).
166. H. BONE,AMERICANPOLITICS
167. Compare Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-LaborParty, 287 F. Supp. 794, 805 (D.
Minn. 1968) with Bendinger v. Oglivie, 335 F. Supp. 572, 575 (N.D.Ill. 1971).
168. Alexander v. Todman, 337 F.2d 962, 973 (3d Cir. 1964) (citing Robinson, The
REPORTS
OF THE
Place of Party in the Political History of the United States, ANNUAL
AMERICAN
~ ~ S T O R I C A ASSOCIATION
L
FOR THE YEARS
1927 AND 1928 at 202 (1929)).
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other parties and independents from voting in a national party
primary ballot."16s Indeed, there seems to be little difference in
effect between the closed and open primary systems:
[Tlhe essence of the legal definitions of party membership
in the United States will surely continue to be self-designation.
The fact remains that today even in Illinois, New York, or any
other closed primary state you are a Democrat if you say you
are; no one can effectively say you are not; and you can become
a Republican any time the spirit moves you simply by saying
that you have become one. You accept no obligations by such a
declaration; you receive only a privilege-the privilege of taking an equal part in the making of a party's most important
decision, the nomination of its candidates for public office. The
only remaining restriction is that in some states, such as California, you may have to let the registrar of voters know that
you have changed parties, and you may even have to do so several weeks or even months before your new party's next primary. But in many closed primary states you do not even have
to do that, and in Wisconsin and other open primary states you
are not allowed to make an official declaration of your party
membership . . . . One can only conclude that the so-called
'closed' primaries are just a hair more closed than the so-called
'open' primaries.170

The significant difference between the open and closed primary is that voters "resent being prohibited from voting if they
refuse to [make] a party declaration and having their afliliation
a matter of public record for fear of losing their jobs or risking
other penalties."171 The difference between the open and closed
primary is not, as advocates of the closed primary would assert,
that the open primary permits large numbers of Republicans, independents, and other party adherents to vote, for example, on
the Democratic Party ballot. Rather, the difference is that the
open primary permits more people to vote for the candidate and
issues of their choice by allowing a private declaration of party
preference. Publicly stating a party preference can be a dilemma
for the independent voter who does not understand the significance of such a public declaration or is unwilling to do so because of a fear of undue pressure or harassment. The question
thus becomes which is worse, the alleged dangers of "crossover"
169. 93 Wis. 2d at 497, 287 N.W.2d at 535.
170. A. RANNEY, CURING
THE MISCHIEFS
OF FACTION
166-67(1975).
THE T W O - P A SYSTEM
'
IN THE UNITED
STATES
207-08(1964).
171. W. GOODMAN,
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voting or the disenfranchisement of independent voters unwilling to record publicly a party preference. It is our contention
that the closed primary system, in light of the Buckley test, cannot support a sufficient governmental interest to justify compelled disclosure of party affiliation.
Conversely, the open primary serves a significant state interest of encouraging voters to participate in selecting the candidates of political parties which, in turn, fosters democratic
government.172 As the Supreme Court has pointed out,
"Preservation of the democratic process is certainly an interest
protection of which may in some instances justify limitations on
First Amendment freedoms."17s Historically, the primary was intended to enlarge citizen participation in the political process
and remove from political bosses the process of selecting candidates. Presumably, the legislatures of open primary states believe democracy is best served by stimulating political activity
and that "facilitat[ing] and enlarg[ing] public discussion and
participation in the electoral process [are] goals vital to a selfgoverning people."174
It is "ironic," as Justice Powell forcefully pointed out in LaFollette, that Rule 2A has the "effect of calling into question a
state law that was intended itself to open up participation in the
nominating process and minimize the influence of 'party
bosses.' "17" The LaFollette decision, with its deference to national party rules allows the political bosses to wrest control of
the nominational process from the hands of the primary voters.
As David Broder commented, "The justices clearly signaled the
Democrats that the way is open for them to begin repair of their
own distorted nominating process by curbing the number of delegates chosen in primaries."176
172. The National Democratic Party in fact replaced the Wisconsin open primary
with a closed caucus system in 1980. A similar displacement was made in Michigan,
which had an open primary system. Only 15,000 people in the state of Michigan participated in the Democratic closed caucus. See N.Y. T i e s , April 27,1980, at p. 1, col. 2. By
comparison, 625,185 people voted in the Wisconsin Democratic primary and 897,464
voted in the Republican primary. 38 CONG.Q. W. RPTS. 901 (April 5, 1980). Wisconsin
had the second highest percentage of voter age turnout in its 1976 primary of the 24
states conducting primaries. A. RANNEY,
PARTICIPATION
IN AMERICAN
PRESIDENTIAL
NOMINATIONS 25 (1977).
173. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 368 (1976).
174. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976).
175: Democratic Party of the United States v. LaFollette, 101 S. Ct. 1010, 1022
(1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
176. Broder, But Will They Change Those Rules, Wash. Post, March 1, 1981, 5 C,
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It has been clear since the NAACP cases were decided,'?'
that "freedom to associate with others for the common advanceprotected by the First
ment of political beliefs and ideas is
A close corollary to the right
and Fourteenth A~nendments."~~~
of association is the right to be free of unwanted association.17@
Even though the Court has traditionally tended to limit the
right of nonparticipation to cases involving personal convictions
in
so deeply held as to be considered matters of cons~ience,'~~
recent years it has extended the right to include situations
where an individual has been required to support a political or
ideological cause with which the individual simply disagrees.lel
The Court, in Elrod v. Burns,le4 held that state officials could
not condition retention of public employment on the afliliation
with a particular political party. Similarly, in Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education,les the Court held that the first amendment
prevents the government from requiring objecting public employees to contribute to union political or ideological activities
not germane to collective bargaining.lM Recently, in Branti v.
Finkel,lB5the Court likewise upheld the right of public defenders to be free from coerced political afliliation as a condition of
employment. This trilogy of cases marks the emergence of a distinctive first amendment right to resist coerced participation in
or support of political or ideological activity. Indeed, the Court
in Abood said that such a right was "at the heart of the First
Amendment."le6 Similarly, the independent voter should not be

...

at 7, col. 2.
177. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963);
NAACP v. Button, 371 US. 415 (1963);Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960);Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960);
and NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
178. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975)(citing Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
U.S. 51, 56-57(1973)).
179. One commentator notes that "[tlhis right has most often been asserted in a
labor law context. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963);
International Ass'n. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961);Railway Employees
Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).See also Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961)
(attack on the dues requirement under an integrated bar system)." Skornicka, State
Action in Presidential Candidate Selection, 1976 U. WIS. L. REV. 1269,1296-97.
180. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
181. For a thorough treatment of this subject area, see Comment, The Right of
Ideological Nonassociation, 66 CAL.L. REV. 767 (1978).
182. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
183. 431-U.S. 290 (1977).
184. Id. a t 235.
185. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
186. 431 US. a t 234-35.
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coerced into joining one of the major parties in order to exercise
the right to vote in a primary.
3. Unjustified discrimination. The third reason for enfranchising the independent voter is that the closed primary also
ignores the right of all persons to vote once the state has decided
to make the right available to some. Membership in either the
Democratic or Republican parties should not be an admission
ticket to the primary ballot box. This is especially so, as the Supreme Court said in United States v. Classic,lm "[wlhere the
state law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure
of choice, or where in fact the primary effectively controls the
choice."188 After all, political parties are not mentioned, directly
The drafters
or indirectly, in the United States Constitution.18@
of the Constitution did not foresee the modern importance of
political parties in the United States. They were nonparty-even
anti-party-independents. Thus on October 2,
1780, John Adams, writing to a friend about the new constitution for Massachusetts, said: "There is nothing which I dread so
much as a division of the republic into two great parties, each
arranged under its leader, and concerting measures in opposition
to each other. This in my humble apprehension, is to be dreaded
as the greatest political evil under our constitution."lM The view
that the rise of political parties was an evil, tending to foment
strife and discord in the body politic, was widespread. George
Washington similarly warned his countrymen "in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party,"lel
and James Madison thought it the principal task of the new
Constitution to hold the "mischiefs of faction"lea in check.
The meaning is clear: the independent voter in a closed primary state is being denied a fundamental right? That in turn
187. 345 U.S.461 (1953).
188. Id. at 467.
189. "Partisan politics bear the imprimatur only of tradition, not the Constitution."
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 369 n.22 (1976).
ADAMS 511 (1854).
190. 9 J. ADAMS,THEWORKSOF JOHN
Farewell Address, reprinted in DOCUMENTS
OF AMERICAN
HIS191. G. WASHINGTON,
TORY 169, 172 (H. Commager ed. 1946).
NO. 10 (J. Madison) at 52 (H. Lodge ed. 1888). Indeed, in the
192. THEFEDERALIST
THEDEADLOCK
OF DEMOCearly 1790's "most Americans did not want parties." J. BURNS,
RACY 27 (1967).
193. Ideally, of course, the primary should not only be open, but also have delegates
allocated in accordance with its results. Although it might be argued, as Justice Powell
suggests with regard to the Vermont primary, Democratic Party v. LaFollette, 101 S. Ct.
1010, 1025 n.11 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting), that a nonbinding primary is but an idle
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can only mean that he is being denied equal protection. But, if
the Supreme Court so held, a major expansion of equal protection could occur-to make the Constitutional standard national
or interstate rather than intrastate. The time has come for such
a development. After all, the fourteenth amendment speaks of
"equal protection of the laws9'-but does not define "laws." Arguably the Justices would not have to embrace a concept of interstate equal protection. They could rule that an independent
voter in a closed primary state was being denied his fourteenth
amendment rights vis-a-vis other voters in that same state. But
under the "new" jurisprudence of the Court, even such a limited
decision would have a general effect.
Ours is a national citizenship.la4Justice Bradley, addressing
the issue of equality in the Slaughter-House Cases, judicially expressed the view of such a citizenship:
A citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional
right to go and reside in any state he chooses, and to claim
citizenship therein, and an equality of rights with every other
citizen . . . . He is not bound to cringe to any superior, or to
pray for any act of grace, as a means of enjoying all the rights
and privileges enjoyed by other citizens . . . . If a man be denied full equality before the law, he is denied one of the essential rights of citizenship as a citizen of the United States.lS6

Although Justice Bradley spoke in dissent, his words capture
nicely the concept of a national citizenship and a "united state."
gesture; nevertheless, the intense attention of the media and the perception of the people
in the other states is to the contrary. In his famed August 1974 memorandum outlining
President Carter's successful 1976 strategy, Hamilton Jordan wrote:
The press shows an exaggerated interest in the early primaries as they
represent the first confrontation between candidates . . . We would do well to
understand the very special and powerful role the press plays in interpreting
the primary results for the rest of the nation. What is actually accomplished in
the New Hampshire primary is less important than how the press interprets it
for the rest of the nation.
J. WITCOVER,
MARATHON
144 (1978). The primary process is important not only as a
delegate selection process, but also, in this "media age," as a means of creating and
m
t
a
i
n
i
n
g the impression of an electable presidential candidate. The independent
voter in Florida, unlike the independent voter in Wisconsin, is cut out of that process.
194. See Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L.
REV.541, 550-51 (1977).
195. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall. 1872) 36,112-13 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Professor Karst notes constitutional support for the idea of equal national citizenship, eg., the prohibition against the granting of titles of nobility by the United States,
.U.S. CONST.,art. I, 5 9, c1. 8; the prohibition against direct federal taxes that are not
proportional to population, id. § 9, cl. 4. Karst, supra note 194, at 550 n.53.
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As Professor Karst wrote a century later, "The substantive core
of the amendment, and of the equal protection clause in particular, is a principle of equal citizenship, which presumptively guarantees to each individual the right to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating
member."19e
Professor Karst maintains that if, after the Civil War, there
could be any doubt that we are all citizens of the United States,
that doubt was removed by the fourteenth amendment's explicit
declaration: "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside."lP7 Indeed,
absent that specific command, Karst believes that a spirit of
national citizenship would prevail, such that we would think of
ourselves primarily as citizens of the nation, and only secondarily of the several states, for "[w]e are all part of one economy;
we are highly mobile, both in capacity and in inclination; a national system of communication hands us the same news and the
same entertainment; we look to the national government as the
chief arena for the interplay of political forces."lB8It is clear that
these aspects of our nationhood demand a generous view of the
"And as those expanded
powers of the national g~vernment.~@@
powers have been exercised, we [Americans] have come to perceive the obligations of citizenship as running primarily to the
national polity."200The principle of equal national citizenship
means more than the correction of abuses by the state; the heart
of the principle is that citizens have the right to equal treatment
by the government. Equality in the electoral process is a crucial
a r m a t i o n of the equal worth of citizens.201
Some may object that such a concept of equal protection
would strike a body blow at federalism and state sovereignty.
Yet, despite recent Supreme Court decisions in support of
196. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV.L. REV.1, 4 (1977).
197. U.S. CONST.amend. XIV.
198. Karst, supra note 194, at 550-51.
199. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-46,59 HARV.L.
REV.645, 883 (1946).
200. Karst, supra note 194, at 551.
201. "To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a
citizen." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964), cited in Karst, supra note 196, at
29.
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states' rights, federalism as it was once known is dead."02 Among
other factors, a national income tax, technological imperatives,
and immersion of the nation in world affairs point to a conclusion that the several states are political anachronism^.^^ If people truly believed in federalism, there would be no New York
City going to the federal government to avoid bankruptcy, no
Chrysler seeking a similar financial bailout, and no state and local governments receiving enormous grants-in-aid from the federal government. The death knell for federalism occurred long
ago; it should be recognized and accepted.
Moreover, the decline of federalism is apparent in the electoral process. Uniform, nationwide standards for electoral practices and voting rights have increasingly supplanted diverse election laws.2MThis result runs contrary to a long history of state
control in conducting elections and defining the scope of the
franchise. One need only look at four developments in the last
twenty-five years to understand how this transfer of power away
from the states has occurred: constitutional amendments;806Supreme Court de~isionmaking;~~
congressional legislation;207and
the Federal Election Comrnis~ion.~~~
202. Strong national unity was recognized by Justice Holmes:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost the power to
declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the union would be imperiled if we
could not make the declaration as to the laws of the several states.
J. BARRON
& C. DIENES,CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 36 (1975).
203. Currently, a national economic system is superimposed on a decentralized political order. Politics and law tend to follow economics; the inexorable result is that the
states will become even less important in the future. See A. IMIUER, SOCIAL
CHANGE
AND
FUNDAMENTAL
LAW43-95 (1979); Miller, Reason of State and the Emergent Constitution
of Control, 64 MINN.L. REV. 585 (1980).
204. For a complete discussion of this subject, see Claude, Nationalizing Electoral
L. REV.373
Process Standards: Is an Obituary for State's Rights Premature? 13 IDAHO
(1977).
205. See note 89 supra.
206. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
207. E.g., the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225,86 Stat. 3
(1972), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-443. Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970) (amended and repealed in part in 1975); Civil Rights Act
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
208. The Commission is the independent agency of the United States government
charged with primary and exclusive jurisdiction to implement civil enforcement of the
federal election laws. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(l) (1976). The laws over which the Commission
has civil enforcement jurisdiction are the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as
amended, supra note 139; the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. 8s
9001-9013 (1976); and the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, 26
U.S.C. g§ 9031-9042 (1976).
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The federalism argument also ignores that the nomination
of a presidential candidate is not a regional or state function but
rather a national function of the national parties. It is clear that
the National Democratic and Republican Parties are no more
than loose federations of state parties. The nomination of a
presidential candidate once every four years is perhaps the only
national organizational effort undertaken by the national parties. The procedure used by both the major parties is clearly a
nationwide process. Political science studies have noted that the
"argument for recognition of state sovereignty in a national poMoreover, to analogize between
litical convention is specious."a0@
a state whose sovereignty in the electoral college is constitutionally established, andethe state political party to the national political party is inappropriate. It has been concluded that "[a] national political party has its federal aspects, such as its
dependence on state victories to give it the electoral votes necessary for winning a presidential election. But in its national convention its chief business, the nomination and election of a President, is an operation more national than federal.''210

Enough has been said to show that voting is indeed a fundamental right, and that voting in primaries should be included in
that right. As long as the two-party system continues, which
may not be more than a few years, a further point can be made:
all voters should be able to cast a ballot in primaries for one of
the candidates in each party. There is no logical reason why
even the Wisconsin system should not be expanded that far. We,
however, do no more than mention the point here; and do not
argue for it at this time. Our net conclusion is that there are
solid legal and policy grounds for fully enfranchising the independent voters in America.
That need not take a constitutional amendment. The Supreme Court can do it in an appropriate case brought, say, by an
independent voter in Florida. What external standards of judgment should the Justices apply should such a case eventuate?
We suggest that the Wisconsin system be enunciated as the constitutional minimum. And, as suggested above, that part of the
209. P. DAVID,
R. GOLDMAN,
&

no~s177 (1960).
210. Id.

R. Bmu, THE POLITICS
OF NATIONAL
PARTYCONVEN-
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Wisconsin system which allows delegate selection by caucus,
without regard to the primary, violates fundamental principles
of fairness. In short, "interstate equal protection" should be the
law, by giving to the word "laws" in the fourteenth amendment
an expansive reading. Whether that is a "neutral principle," as
some people who should know better plump for,"" we do not
say. The point is that a nation that calls itself democratic, that
has a commitment to equality, and that seeks to be a model for
nations elsewhere can no longer suffer the actual disenfranchisement of what is perhaps the largest-certainly the fastest growing-group of voters. There is nothing sacrosanct in the twoparty system; or, indeed, in parties themselves.
In saying all of this, in advocating an interstate standard for
equal protection, we recognize, with Jeremy Bentham, that
"[tlhe establishment of perfect equality is a chimera; all we can
do is to diminish inequality."a1a Interstate equal protection is
one way to do that. Americans living in the zero-sum society deserve no less. Surely, it is the logical extension of the Court's
pronouncement in Cooper v. Aaron that its decisions are "the
law of the land." Equal protection is an area where a fundamental conception should be developed, in Cardozo's words, "to
their uttermost conclusions."a1s
A further point deserves mention. There is no need at this
time to suggest all possible human rights that might be considered to be so fundamental as to fall under the rubric of interstate equal protection. Once the principle is established, as it
can be with the right to vote, then the other areas of concern can
be analyzed with an eye toward determining whether they too
should receive nationwide protection. The concept of national
citizenship in a "united state" that is the United States requires
precisely that.
Some may argue that if regulation of political parties comes
it should be by statute, not be judicial decision. If the elected
representatives of the people in Congress can be persuaded to
enact a comprehensive voting rights law that would go not only
211. See, e-g., Greenwalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78
COLUM.
L. REV. 983 (1978), which is a latter-day celebration of Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutioncrl Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1959) (rightly called "verbally
muddled" by Anthony R. Blackshield of the Faculty of Law, University of Sydney). See
A. MILLER, SOCIALCHANGE
AND FUNDAMENTALLAW 170 (19'79).
212. J. BENTHAM,
THETHEORY
OF LEGISLATION
120 (1931).
WRITINGSOF BENJAMIN
NATHAN
CARDOZO
294 (M. Hall ed. 1947).
213. SELECTB~
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to the right to cast a ballot (as in the Voting Rights Act of 1965)
but also to the ways in which candidates are selected, then there
would be no need for the Court to intervene.214Absent such a
statute (and the likelihood of one being enacted is remote at
best) the Court is the only avenue open to those who are disenfranchised by the present system. The Supreme Court has already involved itself in the election process, principally in the
White Primary and Legislative Reapportionment Cases; hence,
there is no good reason why it should not enter this "political
thicket."21s The essential argument here is not so much over
what should be done, but over how it can be effected. Those who
argue for a quietistic role for the Supreme Court will,of course,
abhor interstate equal protection and call for a legislative resolution;"@ but those who see a larger role for the Court, such as
Professor John Hart Ely with his "representation-reinforcing"
theory of judicial review,"17 just might accept the basic conclusions of this article.

214. The extreme deference the LaFollette Court showed to the political party system poses the question of who, if anyone, can control these private governments. Could,
for example, Congress legislate a national or regional primary system? Arthur Schlesinger Jr. suggests that such a measure "might well administer the coup de grace" to the
political parties and, would almost certainly be opposed by the major parties. Arthur S.
Schlesinger, Crisis of the Party System: XI, Wall St. J., May 14, 1979, at 14, col. 4. If so,
would the principle of LaFollette ("a State, or a court, may not constitutionally substitute its own judgment for that of a party") prohibit or foreclose Congress from doing
that?
215. Baker v. Can, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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